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 I. Egalitarianism and Natural Resources 
 
Egalitarians have long been interested in the benefits and burdens flowing from 
natural resources, and understandably so. Some natural resources (such as water) are 
essential ingredients of any human life; others (such as diamonds) are not essential at 
all but are nevertheless hugely valuable. Nature, though, appears to have favoured 
some of its children over others. Some of us have ready access to valuable resources, 
whilst others have to struggle even to obtain the basic essentials. Meanwhile people, 
lest we credit (or blame) nature for too much, have also done their fair share to build 
upon that unequal foundation. Individuals around the world are forcibly excluded 
from accessing many resources by border guards, police forces, and the security 
personnel of major corporations. Nature, likewise, can hardly be blamed for the ways 
in which access to resources frequently tracks class, gender and ethnicity. Either way, 
egalitarians have frequently been convinced that highly uneven shares of natural 
resources’ benefits and burdens represent serious injustices. 
Indeed egalitarians have often suggested that natural resource inequalities are 
especially egregious – and especially suitable for correction - given the ‘arbitrariness’ 
of the way in which resources have come to be distributed. But just what should they 
demand by way of correction?
 
What would constitute an appropriately egalitarian 
distribution of benefits and burdens? One very well-known answer to that question 
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holds that we are each, individually, entitled to an equal share of benefits. To be clear 
the claim, typically, is not that we are entitled to equal shares of natural resources 
themselves. Indeed it is hard to see why anyone would be attracted to an equal 
division of resources per se, or indeed how we would measure such shares (would the 
principle suggest an equal share of the world’s natural resources divided by weight? 
By volume? By type, and then by volume?). Rather, the claim is typically that 
whatever the benefits and burdens flowing from the world’s resources, we are entitled 
to an equal share of them. Given that natural resources are not created by anyone, but 
are rather a gift of ‘God’ or of ‘nature,’ the thought goes, then an equal distribution of 
that ‘common treasury’ is, in a sense, a birth-right. 
It is this claim that the present paper challenges. It shows, in fact, that 
egalitarians ought to adopt an alternative, more complex position on natural resources, 
and shows how that more complex view has important implications for debates on, for 
instance, resource appropriation and intergenerational justice. But before proceeding 
further, we need to clarify a few issues which the paper does not seek to resolve. First, 
it stays on the surface of debates about just what precisely constitutes a natural 
resource. I do address that question in more depth elsewhere,
1
 but to keep this 
discussion manageable I adopt a general view which is common to both many 
discussions of natural resource justice and to international law: natural resources are a 
category which includes objects not created by human beings.
2
 This could then 
include, somewhat narrowly, familiar items such as oil, diamonds, or water. More 
broadly, it could also include items such as wild animals and plants, and, on some 
accounts, land itself. The argument that follows, if it is a good one, ought to count 
against equal benefits whether the set of ‘natural resources’ is construed relatively 
narrowly or relatively broadly. The point is that however we define natural resources 
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– unless we expand that category to include all of the goods relevant to justice, in 
which case it fails to single out anything distinctive – the argument for equal benefits 
fails. Second, I take it that an account of natural resource justice should be interested 
in both the benefits and the burdens arising from natural resources. Often discussion 
has appeared to focus on benefits: on, for instance, distributing the economic value of 
natural resources.  But burdens matter too and if, for instance, we hold that no-one 
ought to be disadvantaged through uneven access to the benefits arising from natural 
resources, the same conclusion should follow for burdens. But I do not attempt to 
adjudicate the question of what metric we might use to judge whether the benefits and 
burdens enjoyed by any two individuals are equal. It might be that equal benefits 
should be gauged by some measure of the welfare or capabilities that natural 
resources support, or by shares of their monetary value, or by establishing what 
individuals would bid for them in a hypothetical auction, for example. In what follows 
I use ‘equal benefits’ as a shorthand for an equal division of the benefits and burdens 
flowing from all of the world’s natural resources however the particular views under 
discussion propose to measure those benefits and burdens against one another. Third, 
as should be clear, the paper addresses itself to egalitarians and not to sufficientarians 
or prioritarians about justice. Addressing those other views would be worthwhile but 
would make the discussion unmanageable. In any case it is egalitarians who have 
suggested that justice requires equal shares of natural resource benefits, and the 
contribution of this paper is to show that such a view is mistaken, that it ought to be 
rejected in favour of a more complex view, and to spell out some of the implications 
for egalitarian justice. 
In section II of this paper I briefly demonstrate the wide support which the 
idea of equal shares of benefits has commanded. Section III then examines, but rejects, 
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four arguments in favour of equal natural resource benefits, the first two of which 
focus on the general normative distinctiveness of natural resources, whereas the final 
two properly raise concerns of non-ideal theory. Working through and individually 
refuting the various arguments is necessary to show that a very prominent egalitarian 
view on natural resources is mistaken. Instead global egalitarians have compelling 
reasons to prefer an alternative set of principles to govern the distribution of any 
benefits, which I elucidate in section IV. The first secures for each of us access to the 
resources necessary for meeting our basic rights. The second favours equal benefits 
just in case we have good reason to fear that unequal access to natural resources 
specifically and perniciously sustains other inequalities - such as inequalities in status 
organised according to gender or ethnicity – and where equal benefits promise to be 
particularly efficacious in tackling those other inequalities. But whilst this will often 
be the case it is not always so, and hence the argument for equal shares does not 
strongly generalise. Our third principle endorses not equal resource benefits but 
equalizing shares of benefits. We should use the proceeds of any global tax on natural 
resources, that is, to ameliorate inequalities not specifically in natural resource 
holdings, but rather to address inequalities across the range of advantages and 
disadvantages relevant to egalitarian justice. That implies that we ought to carefully 
target the proceeds of any resource taxes: doing the most good, from a broad 
egalitarian point of view, is likely to require that we disburse natural resource benefits 
highly unevenly. 
The implications of this account are manifold. One surprising finding is 
precisely that a principle which has enjoyed the support of a great many important 
philosophers of justice turns out to be indefensible. But the account has important 
implications for discussions of the appropriation of natural resources, and in turn for 
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concrete issues such as the right to emit carbon dioxide. In section V I show that what 
is a very familiar ‘narrow’ egalitarian proviso applying to appropriation of scarce 
resources, for instance, ought to be rejected in favour of a ‘broad’ proviso on 
appropriation. In section VI, finally, I briefly sketch the implications of the view for 
intergenerational justice. 
 
 II. Support for Equal Benefits 
 
In the seventeenth century, the idea that the earth was (at least originally) given to 
humankind in common – with no-one having any special claims to it - provided a 
shared starting-point for Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Samuel von 
Pufendorf, among others. But the widespread view that the natural resources of the 
world formed a ‘common treasury’ was only turned by to radical ends by some, as by 
the English radical Gerrard Winstanley who declared in 1649 that ‘the Earth, with all 
her fruits of Corn, Cattle, and such like, was made to be a common Store-house of 
Livelihood to all Mankind, friend, and foe without exception,’ and used that to justify 
a campaign of (peaceful) insurrection against the landed elite of the time.
3
 But for 
Locke, famously, private property could, subject to certain provisos, justly be 
removed from the common stock. Only where those provisos were violated did it 
make sense to talk of compensation for appropriation.
4
 Others argued that our 
common inheritance of the earth’s resources produced an argument for an equal share 
of benefits, perhaps taking the form of an equal basic income. Thus Thomas Paine 
claimed that each of us is ‘a joint life proprietor, with the rest, in the property of the 
soil, and in all its natural productions, vegetable and animal.’ He argued, as a result, 
for a right to a basic capital stake for all, and a basic income for people over fifty 
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years of age ‘in lieu of the natural inheritance, which, as a right, belongs to every 
man.’5 Eighty years later Henry George argued for a tax on the unimproved value of 
land and its resources, with the proceeds being shared equally between all.
6
 
In more recent debates about global justice, a version of the same idea has 
been reprised by Charles Beitz, who argued that even if we lived in a world of self-
contained societies, the highly unequal distribution of natural resources between 
societies should be troubling from the point of view of justice. Rather than allowing 
societies to suffer (or prosper) as a result of this uneven distribution we should instead 
embrace a principle which would see the value of natural resources redistributed to at 
least mitigate the inequalities emanating from it.
7
 Beitz was in the end reticent about 
the role such a principle should play in a fully developed account of global justice, 
and instead embraced a global difference principle the implications of which for 
resources would likely be quite different.
8
 But others have been less reticent. Brian 
Barry argued for a principle which equally distributed the value of the world’s natural 
resources, again chiefly because of the moral arbitrariness of their distribution.
9
  Both 
Joseph Mazor and Steve Vanderheiden have recently defended similar views.
10
 So too, 
on the basis of a more challenging rendering of the Lockean proviso, have the left-
libertarians Hillel Steiner, Michael Otsuka, and Peter Vallentyne.
11
  
But why, from an egalitarian point of view, should we be attracted to the idea 
of equal natural resource shares? Four possible reasons are assessed in the next 
section. But showing how each of them fails leaves the field open for the alternative 
approach defended in the rest of the paper.  
 






i) natural resources as the sole currency of equality? 
 
A first argument for equal shares would show that they provided the most appropriate 
currency for egalitarianism. Insofar as equality appeals to us, what we are troubled by 
is unequal shares of natural resource benefits; as such by definition it is natural 
resource benefits – and only natural resource benefits – which we should seek to 
equalize.  
One general way to resist our first argument would be to invoke scepticism 
about the likelihood that any single metric can be provided for egalitarianism in any 
case, or, to put it another way, to suggest that insofar as we care about advantage and 
disadvantage, we are stuck with a conception of advantage which is irreducibly 
heterogeneous, incorporating a concern with the distribution of both resources and 
welfare.
13
 Those who are sceptical about resolving the enduring ‘currency’ problem in 
such a neat way will be unpersuaded that equal natural resource benefits provide an 
exhaustively satisfying currency for equality.  
But in fact equal benefits should also be rejected by adherents of all of the 
major currencies. It would command distinctly limited support, for instance, from 
those who favoured currencies for equality which focused on welfare or capabilities. 
First, natural resources will ‘fuel’ the welfare or capabilities of different individuals in 
uneven ways, so that an individual with a debilitating illness, for instance, may 
require more resources than another simply to sustain equal levels of welfare or 
capability. Second, natural resources are not the only significant drivers of welfare or 
capabilities; thus an individual with hugely marketable abilities may, other things 
being equal, be able to develop the same capabilities or welfare levels as one of her 
less lucky fellows even in the presence of glaring inequalities in natural resource 
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benefits. It would then be undesirable to insist on equal natural resource benefits in 
the light of that fact.
14
 Strikingly, a principle of equal benefits would transfer benefits 
from societies with large shares of natural resources but which are relatively 
impoverished overall (such as Nigeria), to communities which are on average very 
wealthy but which enjoy relatively meagre shares of natural resources (like 
Switzerland). But this would be highly inappropriate if what we were concerned about 
was overall welfare or capability levels. Even a broad claim that implementing 
equality of welfare or of capabilities would tend to demand rather more equal shares 
of natural resources than currently exists would serve us very poorly in many cases.
15
  
We might expect advocates of resourcist versions of equality to find the idea 
of equal natural resource benefits rather more attractive. Ronald Dworkin for instance 
suggested a vision of equality in which people ought to have an equal ability to obtain 
the resources which matter to them. But still, even for a defender of equality of 
resources it would be unjustifiably narrow to insist on equal distribution of (rights 
over) natural resources in particular.
16
 Stipulating that equality demands only equal 
natural resource benefits would again appear odd in the light of other inequalities in 
for instance internal endowments, or in other valued social goods. Once a concern 
about natural resources is nested within a broader account of egalitarian justice, it is 
not obvious why inequalities in natural resources might not sometimes be offset by 
shares of other goods, and vice versa.
17
  
 A robust version of the claim that natural resources are the solely appropriate 
distribuenda for an egalitarian theory is defended by Hillel Steiner, but the difficulties 
his theory faces are instructive.  For Steiner, axiomatically, things are either natural 
resources – in which case we have symmetrical claims over them - or they are the 
products of labour on which there can be no redistributive claim. In that sense, natural 
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resources are the only contender in the search for an appropriate target for 
redistribution. Importantly, the theory is also intended to enact a choice / circumstance 
distinction: it is because no-one is responsible for creating natural resources that we 
all have symmetrical claims over them, whereas the fruits of our own labour – which 
we are presumably responsible for choosing to exert, or not – are properly considered 
immune from the redistributive project.  
However, Steiner’s position faces challenges in insulating distribution from 
the influence of unchosen circumstance. The first challenge is that of voluntary 
transfers between individuals. Even with initially equal resource shares, some of us 
will make more of our natural resources than others, and we might then seek to pass 
those (legitimate) advantages onto others. Steiner’s theory accepts voluntary in-life 
transfers, and hence cannot eradicate inequalities based upon brute luck.
18
 His theory 
does seek to block on-death bequests, though, even though these will regularly 
include artefacts made with human labour (since normally bequests will include 
things like houses, poetry, or shares in telecommunications companies). In doing so it 
faces a dilemma. It must either define the content of bequests as natural resources, 
even though they are the product of (dead) human labour. Or it must depict the 
currency of justice as natural resources plus the content of any bequests – and 
therefore relinquish the claim that natural resources are the only appropriate 
distribuendum for a theory of equality.  
 A second challenge for Steiner’s theory concerns the unequal earning power 
of the living. Living people are, for Steiner, fully entitled to what they produce with 
their own labour. But will the theory therefore endorse inequalities based upon 
varying internal endowments? Steiner accepts that an account which focused 
exclusively on natural resources conventionally understood would be ‘insufficiently 
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egalitarian,’ in concentrating on ‘external’ at the expense of ‘personal’ resources,19 
but his response is to define internal endowments themselves – or at least, the ‘germ-
line genetic information’ coded in our DNA - as natural resources on which there is 
an egalitarian redistributive claim.  
 My concern, here, is not whether human germ-line information should be 
considered a natural resource or not. The problem is that even when we include it in 
the category of natural resources we remain incapable of fully delivering on the 
choice / circumstance distinction which Steiner claims animates his theory. By way of 
remedy for the inegalitarian effects of parents’ appropriation of germ-line information 
of varying earning-power, Steiner suggests that we tax the appropriation of genes 
linked to superior earning power, and compensate those who appropriate genes linked 
to inferior earning power.
20
 But taxing parents now for the estimated future earning 
power of their children can hardly prevent children from later benefiting unequally 
from their unequal talents. At best the taxation of parents will narrow likely 
inequalities, by making the parents of ‘gifted’ children poorer on average, and hence 
less able to pass some of their erstwhile advantages on to their children – as Steiner 
acknowledges.
21
 Hence the theory’s ability to prevent children from benefiting from 
unequal talents is distinctly limited: as in the case of bequests, even an egalitarian 
account which defines natural resources very broadly will fail to block inequalities 
which we have good reason to care about. 
 
ii) the distinctive arbitrariness of natural resource distribution? 
 
A second claim would hold that equal natural resource benefits are demanded because 
existing benefit shares are arbitrary in a way in which other inequalities are not. If 
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existing claims over benefits are especially weak, then perhaps we have a reason for 
concentrating upon their equalization. That kind of claim is familiar in the global 
justice literature, but it faces the same challenge as our first claim: if natural resources 
are not all that matters from the point of view of equality, then why insist on equal 
benefits?  
 The response might be that the drive to equalize has a special strength or 
robustness in the case of natural resources precisely because their currently unequal 
distribution is a matter of brute luck; as such the egalitarian argument is not dependent 
on any controversial claims about the genesis of its distribution in human institutions 
or interactions. Take Charles Beitz’s argument by way of example. Beitz famously 
suggested that a resource redistribution principle could apply even in a counterfactual 
world of autarkic nation-states. The argument, it might be thought, is especially robust 
because it does not depend on empirical claims about the effects of globalization, or 
the emergence of global social cooperation. Unequal resource benefits would require 
correction even if globalization had not occurred, because it represents a pernicious 




 But this position is highly vulnerable. The claim that unequal resource benefits 
are objectionable whether or not they are produced within the ambit of any global 
institution or association still fails to identify anything special about natural resources. 
If the intuition underlying that claim is that arbitrary factors ought not to influence our 
prospects, then we would surely be led in the direction of a global egalitarian 
principle which also sought to correct inequalities arising from climate, geography, 
and also unequal personal endowments. We cannot rule out such possibilities by 
suggesting that these advantages or disadvantages are not social products and are 
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hence inappropriate objects for distribution. Such a response would undercut Beitz’s 
resource redistribution principle too, since he clearly views such resources as not 
being ‘social’ products either. We seem to be required to say either that principles of 
justice apply only to social products (in which case they apparently never apply to 
natural resources), or to say that they apply to inequalities whether produced by social 
cooperation or not (in which case singling out natural resources alone for equalization 
is unjustified).  
Even if we accept that they are ‘manna from heaven,’ then, natural resources 
do not appear to be the only thing which their holders are not responsible for creating, 
and over which claims might therefore appear to be weak. Some of us are faced with a 
situation whereby the particular language we speak enables us to access valuable 
opportunities more easily. Some of us inherit intellectual property rights from our 
famous forebears, or fortunes based on singing or playing the violin. We are each of 
us born into situations of quite multifarious but often likewise unearned advantages 
and disadvantages, many of which do not have much obvious connection with natural 
resources, but which are likewise unchosen by their recipients. Once we admit a 
concern for these other inequalities into our account of justice, the case for opting for 
equal shares of natural resource benefits in particular disappears. 
   
iii) the distinctive invidiousness of natural resource inequality? 
 
Even if the idea of equal natural resource benefits has very limited appeal when 
conceived of as an exhaustive account of egalitarian justice, we might still have 
reason, within a broader egalitarian account, to favour equal shares of natural resource 
benefits in particular. Even egalitarian accounts concerned with a considerable range 
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of goods might still find reason to ‘hypothecate’ some of them. Hypothecation here 
refers to the way in which an egalitarian account will select out a good or perhaps 
several goods and demand (perhaps relatively) equal shares of these goods, regardless 
of the distribution of other valued goods. In so doing, it will treat some goods as 
morally incommensurable with other goods, so that advantages or disadvantages 
‘elsewhere’ are not held to compensate for or offset unequal holdings in these specific 
goods. To give an example, egalitarians might be strongly committed to the political 
principle of ‘one person, one vote.’ If so then they would believe that unequal shares 
of income, say, ought not to be offset by giving extra votes to the poor. Alternatively, 
they might say that inequalities in access to education ought not to compensated for 
by giving those thereby deprived greater shares of healthcare. Hypothecating a good 
suggests that there is a distinctive wrongness about its unequal distribution, which 
cannot or ought not be offset by shares of other goods. 
In many cases we will accept some commensurability between goods: for 
example, many egalitarians will be content with a society in which some have chosen 
more leisure, and others more income. But most, on reflection, would not accept 
complete commensurability between all goods, and indeed I would submit that any 
plausible egalitarian theory will resist complete commensurability across goods. But 
why might we see it as inappropriate to use extra votes to offset unequal income, or 
extra healthcare to offset unequal educational opportunities? One compelling reason 
for insisting on equal shares of particular goods – which takes us into the domain of 
non-ideal theory - will apply if we know that inequalities in the distribution of those 
goods will persistently and invasively lead to inequalities in our holdings of other 
goods. Perhaps in societies characterised by widespread injustice we know that 
inequalities in education lead – because it is such a ‘positional’ good - to pervasive 
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inequalities across the whole of economic life. For that reason, we might have 
especially strong strategic reasons to favour equality in educational provision.
23
 
Alternatively, the thought may be that in a society (or world) committed to social 
equality or equality of status, we will have good reason, at least in some cases, to 
insist on equality with regards to certain specific goods.
24
 To formulate the principle 
more defensively, I suggest that we have a reason to hypothecate goods wherever 
there is a history of inequality of status (such as entrenched gender or ethnic 
inequality), where that inequality of status is bound up in unequal shares of the good 
in question, and where hypothecating the good in question appears likely to be 
successful in breaking that chain of disadvantage. If women, or certain ethnic groups, 
for example, have been deprived of equal access to certain jobs or colleges (and if, as 
often happens, their failure to permeate those sectors has served as perverse ‘proof’ of 
their inferiority), then we might have strong reasons to seek equal access to those jobs 
or colleges even if those women or ethnic groups have excellent opportunities 
elsewhere. A commitment to equal status provides us with a reason to disdain certain 
inequalities which we would otherwise accept, and the argument for doing so 
becomes still stronger in the context of profound and ingrained inequalities of status. 
Still, even if the egalitarian case for hypothecating some goods is sound, why 
hypothecate natural resources in particular? It seems plausible that the idea of equality 
of status can lead us some way in that direction. We know that women have been 
excluded from property ownership in many countries (including ownership of natural 
resources), and that these inequalities are bound up, in a complex way, with the view 
of them as less than full citizens (by which we mean that their inferior access to 
resources is both a cause, and an effect, of their inequality of status). In such societies 
addressing gender inequalities might plausibly entail ensuring that women have 
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roughly equal access to natural resource benefits. There are also many indigenous 
communities members of which have been deprived of access to valued natural 
resources, and been the subject of enduring inequalities of status, with regards to 
whom the same argument is plausible. In such cases, hypothecating equal natural 
resource benefits makes egalitarian sense. But it is important to note that this is not an 
argument for equal shares of natural resources simpliciter. Instead, it is an argument 
that we sometimes have reasons to favour greater equality of resources in some 
communities, across certain social groups. Our third possible reason, then, also fails 
to support equal shares of natural resource benefits across the board. 
 
iv) pragmatic or strategic reasons for equal resource shares? 
 
A fourth argument (or set of arguments) for equal resource benefits is more pragmatic 
in character. The claim here is that a policy advocating equal resource benefits enjoys 
strategic or practical advantages that other egalitarian strategies do not posses. Joseph 
Mazor, for instance, notes that the drive to equalize holdings in a whole series of 
social goods presents theories of justice with a set of epistemic difficulties, since that 
would require us to possess facts about innate capacities, individual choices and so on. 
By contrast, establishing and then taxing (unequal) holdings of natural resources 
might be relatively straightforward from the practical point of view. We might also 
think, along with many economists, that taxing natural resources is relatively efficient 
(in the sense that it is less prone to producing disincentive effects) than taxing other 
goods such as income.
25
 Indeed we might even think that taxing natural resources is 
less likely to interfere with liberty than taxing other social goods.
26
 Finally, we might 
believe that even if natural resources are not distinctive in their manna-from-heaven 
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quality, it might be relatively easy to persuade people to accept taxes on natural 
resources simply because countervailing claims over them appear to be particularly 
weak, and that taxes on natural resources are likely to command especially broad 
philosophical or political support.
27
 In sum, although inequalities in natural resource 
benefits are not all that matters, they are an area in which progress can relatively 
easily be made. For all of these reasons, it could be that pursuing equal shares of 
natural resource benefits represents the most feasible way of making progress towards 
equality more broadly construed.
28
  
Now these various considerations have some force. It may well make sense to 
prioritise taxes on natural resources, and perhaps it is the case that the incidental costs 
of doing so (including both financial costs, and costs to liberty) might be more meagre 
compared with the costs of taxing other goods. However, these considerations offer 
no support whatsoever to equal natural resource benefits. An egalitarian could agree 
that there are good practical reasons for prioritising the pursuit of natural resource 
taxes, and affirm that this is indeed an area in which the chances of success are 
relatively good. She could even agree that natural resource taxes look especially 
attractive because of their efficiency and their (relatively small) effects on liberty. But 
that does not commit us to any particular view on how to disburse the proceeds from 
such taxes. We could accept all of Mazor’s arguments for natural resource taxes and 
simply say: grant all of the proceeds to the poorest individuals of the world. We could 
even say, in fact, that it is precisely because it is relatively unlikely that we are going 
to be able to directly attack other inequalities any time soon that we should use the 
revenues to ameliorate whichever inequalities concern us the most, rather than 
restricting our attention to one subset of inequalities that coincide haphazardly at best 
with overall advantage and disadvantage. In short, even if there are good reasons to 
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favour taxes on natural resources as a priority for global justice, this offers no support 
for the idea of equal benefits.  
 
 IV. Natural Resource Benefits and the Demands of Equality 
 
Section III suggested that a very widespread and simple view about the implications 
of egalitarianism for the case of natural resources is mistaken. Normatively, there are 
no good grounds for distributing the benefits arising from natural resources equally. If 
as egalitarians we ought to care about a whole range of inequalities, a policy aimed at 
sharing natural resource benefits equally will be defectively egalitarian. Given the 
poor correlation between natural resource wealth and overall shares of important 
goods, such a policy would often move funds from people who are, in fact, doing very 
badly overall in terms of advantage broadly construed, and give them to people who 
are doing considerably better. Even in cases where natural resource benefits do 
correlate well with shares in other goods – where those with fewer natural resources 
are also worse off in other ways – such a policy would still be insufficiently 
egalitarian, because it would give precisely the same share of natural resource benefits 
to the rich as it would to the poor of the world. Even if there are good strategic 
reasons for pursuing the taxation of natural resources, egalitarians ought to reject 
equal shares of the proceeds. 
What can we say positively, then, about the demands of equality with regards 
to the value of natural resources? First, we will sometimes want to avoid gender and 
ethnicity-based inequalities in natural resource benefits, especially in societies with a 
history of exclusion from resource ownership where this exclusion has fed into a 
vicious cycle of prejudice and stigma. This will provide support for active measures to 
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enhance natural resource rights for such marginalised groups. Whilst the approach to 
equality which I have defended is broadly holist, it does endorse the hypothecation of 
goods in some circumstances. But whilst there can be reasons to prefer equal natural 
resource benefits in particular cases, this does not generate an argument for globally 
equal natural resource benefits. 
Second, egalitarians should also seek to (modestly) constrain otherwise 
unacceptable inequalities by defending a basic entitlement to some essential natural 
resources. Here we will want to say, roughly, that humans are entitled to sufficient 
shares of any natural resources which are necessary for them to meet their basic 
human rights. In making this claim, of course, we reconnect with the tradition of 
Paine, George and their forebears – many of whom insisted that each person had the 
right to use the common stock to ensure their subsistence - as well as with some more 
recent commentators.
29
 Such a principle is capable of commanding broad support; 
even those with a more modest account of global justice will find reason to object to a 
world in which many people are deprived of access to resources which are key to 
human wellbeing. All human beings, simply as human beings, will unavoidably 
require certain quantities of specific natural resources such as freshwater and clean air. 
Although it would be perverse to stipulate a universal entitlement to equal shares of 
freshwater, for instance, it makes sense to secure the basic shares necessary to support 
basic human rights.
30
 We ought to specify such a claim whenever specific natural 
resources serve basic interests in non-substitutable ways. 
Securing basic rights in this way will not exhaust the total benefits arising 
from natural resources. There will remain a large ‘surplus’ of benefits which may, on 
some accounts, be vulnerable to taxation in the interests of global justice. Still, even if 
we accept an egalitarian account of global justice this does not lead inexorably to the 
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conclusion that this surplus ought to be distributed evenly. More likely, it ought to be 
distributed – for egalitarian reasons - with a strong priority towards poor individuals 
across the world, targeted in such a way as to offset broader inequalities in access to 
valued social goods. We ought to favour then, third, ‘equalizing’ rather than equal 
shares of benefits.  
The proceeds of any such taxes are likely to be best used in a variety of ways 
which have relatively little directly to do with natural resources (including funding 
progress in dealing with endemic diseases, for instance, or supporting primary 
education). But in many cases they will also be well spent on major infrastructure 
projects where the connection to resources is closer, such as projects designed to 
secure stable and sustainable access to key resources such as clean freshwater, to fund 
‘technology transfer’ schemes to spread green technologies in the developing world, 
and to fund the protection of natural resources of common concern to all of 
humankind, such as the rainforests and the polar regions.
31
 This allocation will be 
informed by a desire to reduce global inequalities and to advance intergenerational 
justice. But in a world of multifarious advantage and disadvantage we should not 
assume that the egalitarian impulse can best be met by way of strictly equal shares of 
benefits. 
 
 V. Limits on Appropriation 
 
One of the major areas of contestation within discussions of land and natural 
resources has long been the extent to which given agents are at liberty to appropriate 
natural resources from common stocks and convert them into private property. It is 
sometimes suggested in debates about rights over land that this has become an 
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essentially historical question. Barring the polar regions we live in a more or less 
wholly appropriated world; Locke’s suggestion that those who do not consent to a 
particular sovereign could begin their own commonwealths elsewhere has been 
rendered irrelevant by the virtual demise of terra nullius. What an investigation of 
limits to appropriation can tell us now, if anything, is how appropriation could have 
justly occurred, and this might have lessons – though likely not straightforward ones, 
given the complex facts of history – for present distributions.32  
 But even if the original appropriation of land is of mainly historical interest, 
appropriation is a live, contemporary and important issue when we switch our 
attention to natural resources. Apparently unowned natural resources are still being 
appropriated on a continual basis: individuals collect rainwater for use in drinking, 
cooking and cleaning, or harness energy from solar radiation to use in domestic 
heating; corporations are exploring for oil in the deep sea hundreds of miles from the 
nearest inhabited land; individuals – all individuals – have ‘carbon footprints,’ by 
which we mean that they are all, to wildly differing degrees, consuming the ability of 
the atmosphere or other carbon sinks to absorb greenhouse gases. Meanwhile valuable 
minerals and fossil fuels are being extracted from under the territories of nation-states, 
and whereas international law grants nation-states sweeping privileges over ‘their’ 
natural resources, at the level of theory their right to do so and to retain the proceeds 
is a live rather than a settled question.
33
 
 The question of limits to appropriation is therefore an immensely important 
one, which drives discussions, for instance, of climate justice. Just how much of the 
atmosphere’s carbon-absorptive capacity can a given agent justly consume? Just how 
much solar energy, or oil, or wind-power can she remove from common stocks 
without committing an injustice? Locke’s famous answer to that question suggested 
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that there was a moral limit to appropriation where appropriation ceased to leave 
‘enough and as good’ for others to appropriate.34 That apparently simple claim has 
been taken up in very different ways, but for many, and influentially, it generates an 
egalitarian proviso according to which we commit an injustice – and owe 
compensation, at the very least – when we appropriate more than a symmetrical share 
of natural resources – or natural resource benefits. However, it is hard to see how such 
a restrictive egalitarian limit on appropriation can be defended. A necessary move 
here is to distinguish between a ‘narrow egalitarian proviso’ and a ‘broad’ one. A 
narrow egalitarian proviso places limits on appropriating natural resource benefits in 
particular, and hence rejects appropriation beyond symmetrical shares even when this 
might usefully offset other inequalities. A broad egalitarian proviso will allow 
appropriation beyond symmetrical shares where this usefully forwards equality across 
the whole range of goods relevant to distributive justice. For instance, a welfarist 
egalitarian might allow appropriation of benefits for each agent until such a point that 
their welfare functions become equal; that will place far stricter limits on some 
agents’ appropriation than on others.35 A narrow egalitarian proviso, it should be clear, 
is unduly restrictive, assuming that unequal appropriation might be acceptable – even 
useful – if it alleviated significant inequalities in the holdings of other goods. 
 This has important implications for the practice of regulating acquisition, as 
can be illustrated through the example of climate justice. The principle of equal per 
capita greenhouse gas emissions enjoys considerable support in discussions of climate 
justice, and is often taken to be justified on much the same grounds as the purported 
entitlement to equal natural resource benefits; in the light of the fact that no-one has 
created the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases, we might ask whether 
there can ever be good reasons to allow some agents to generate more emissions than 
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others. But it is not difficult to provide such reasons. A principle which specifies 
equal per capita emissions but ignores the scale of the other impacts we make on the 
carbon cycle (such as, perhaps, protecting or enhancing carbon sinks such as 
rainforests) is myopic. It is unduly restrictive to focus on one kind of carbon ‘debit’ 
alone, to the exclusion of other debits and of possible ‘credits’ generated by our other 
activities.
36
 Moreover at the bar of justice a principle of equal per capita emissions is 
unduly generous to agents who already enjoy greater shares of other important goods, 
vis-à-vis those whose lives are blighted by poverty, underdevelopment and a general 
lack of opportunities. This is not to say, of course, that an equal per capita emissions 
principle would not represent a great advance on the status quo. Likewise there may 
be strategic considerations which count in favour of equal emissions rights (it might, 
for instance, be the case that such a principle is more capable of securing lasting 
agreement than its competitors). But it is far from optimal from the point of view of 
equality.  
  
 VI. Intergenerational Justice 
 
If we assume that our account of intergenerational justice should be egalitarian, the 
argument of this paper also has important implications for the question of the shares 
we should leave behind for future generations. An egalitarian principle of 
intergenerational justice will demand that we ought not, if we can at all avoid it, 
impede the ability of future generations to lead lives for which the advantages and 
disadvantages relevant to distributive justice are as good as those we have enjoyed 
ourselves. But even assuming such a position, it does not appear to be a requirement 
of justice that generations across time ought to have equal shares of natural resource 
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benefits. That is so for all of the familiar reasons we have rehearsed in previous 
sections: in contexts of multifaceted, countervailing inequalities, equal natural 
resource benefits will augment, rather than challenge, the inequalities we ought to 
care about. But in the case of intergenerational justice, we have additional reasons for 
resisting equal benefits. Assume, for example, that what we care about is the ability of 
natural resources to drive access to welfare. That view implies, clearly, that each 
generation ought to face a world in which any natural resource benefits hold the same 
potential to fuel welfare.
37
  In the case of the current generation, we have some 
information – albeit imperfect information – about the role that natural resources play 
in sustaining the welfare of people across the world. We also have some (rather 
imperfect) information about other aspects of advantage and disadvantage: we know a 
lot about global gulfs in life expectancy, in literacy levels, income levels, and so on. 
When we shift our attention to future generations our information about both of these 
things becomes radically less secure. We do not know just how future generations will 
convert natural resource benefits into welfare, and hence just how important such 
benefits will be to their lives. It might well be that their industries will be radically 
more efficient than ours, and hence that much smaller shares of benefits will be 
sufficient to serve their interests equally as well as ours. It is a widespread view that 
future generations will be much better off than us in financial terms, that they will live 
longer and healthier lives, and that they will generally benefit from a host of 
technological advancements unavailable to us. If so, leaving future generations a 
share of benefits equal to our own appears unnecessary. On the other hand, it may be 
that we are, through our reckless pursuit of economic growth, consigning future 
generations to relatively impoverished lives. On such empirical grounds we are 





But we are not morally rudderless in our contemplation of intergenerational 
justice. For one thing, the basic rights constraint should remain in place with regard to 
future generations. Even if we know little about how natural resources will serve the 
welfare of future generations, we can be reasonably sure that future generations will 
be similar enough to us to need clean water, air and so on just as we do. We should 
therefore leave future generations enough natural resources to meet what can 
reasonably be foreseen to be their basic rights. This is not to say, to be clear, that we 
ought to be egalitarian about present generations, and sufficientarian about future 
generations. The point is the same as for current generations: as global egalitarians, 
we have scant reason to favour strictly equal resource benefits, assuming that we care 
about advantage in a suitably broad sense. But we do have good reasons for endorsing 
a basic rights constraint, and endorsing equalizing shares of benefits. We should apply 
the same principle in the case of future generations. 
For another, even in the face of a good deal of indeterminacy it may be 
plausible to adhere to some kind of precautionary principle.
38
 It is not baseless 
conjecture to assert that we are leaving behind us a world in which any future 
generations will have fewer opportunities than us to interact with wildlife, use non-
renewable energy sources, emit greenhouse gases, and breathe clean air. Even if we 
cannot know for sure just what their overall levels of advantage will be, it is obvious 
that many current practices are highly damaging to what we can reasonably expect 
will be required for decent lives in the future. Moreover, we might well believe that it 
is wrong if future generations will miss out because of a massive loss of biodiversity, 
or that we should not unjustly deprive future generations of the ability to lead good 









In a slogan, the egalitarian’s attitude to natural resources should be: tremendously 
important, but nothing special. Although some accounts have devoted considerable – 
and sometimes exclusive – attention to sharing the benefits they bestow upon us, 
natural resources truly are not special – in providing a currency for equality, in the 
arbitrariness of their distribution, in the invidiousness of unequal holdings in them. 
They are, of course, hugely important to us. But since they are not all that matters, an 
egalitarian account which grants them their rightful place will not call for equal shares 
of benefits and burdens. That position, much-beloved though it has been down the 
history of modern political thought, is not egalitarian enough. The pursuit of equality 
would be better served by taxing natural resource benefits and distributing the 
proceeds to advance the interests of the most impoverished. Likewise, insofar as an 
egalitarian proviso should govern the appropriation of natural resources – whether we 
think of this as appropriation now, or appropriation vis-à-vis future generations – it 
should be what I have called a broad egalitarian proviso calling for similarly 
equalizing – but not equal – shares of benefits. There is likely much to be gained from 
focusing on natural resources as an entry point for global egalitarian arguments, 
perhaps because taxes on natural resources would be relatively easy to administer, or 
relatively likely to command support. Indeed I hope that this is so. But identifying that 
possible strategic advantage does not provide any direction on how the proceeds of 
any such taxes should be used. Here the likelihood remains – especially if targeting 
natural resources is going to be one of the more navigable routes towards global 
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